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The shock 2017 General Election result was widely characterised as a ‘youthquake’. We argue 
that young people reshaped the political landscape through a dramatic surge in support for the 
Labour Party, and through their online and offline activism. By investigating both intergenerational 
and intragenerational trends, we draw the contours of a politically active cosmopolitan-left group 
of younger citizens. 
 
‘”Youthquake”: how and why young people reshaped the political landscape in 2017’  
(2160 words not including footnotes and references) 
James Sloam (Royal Holloway University), Rakib Ehsan (Royal Holloway University), and Matt 
Henn (Nottingham Trent University) 
The 2017 General Election result was described as a ‘youthquake’1 – a shock result founded on an 
unexpected surge in youth turnout and the overwhelming support of younger voters for Jeremy 
Corbyn’s Labour Party. Ipsos MORI data, ‘How Britain Voted in 2017’ (released after the election) 
revealed some dramatic changes amongst younger voters. Ipsos MORI and the Essex Continuous 
Monitoring Survey (Whiteley and Clarke 2017) both estimated an increase in youth turnout of around 
20 percentage points As we (Sloam and Ehsan 2017a) show in our report for the Intergenerational 
Foundation, a remarkable 62% of 18-24 year olds voted for the Labour Party, contrasting with 27% 
for the Conservative Party. The gap in support for the two main parties amongst this cohort - 35 
percentage points – was unprecedented in size.  
The excitement generated by the election was such that the Oxford English Dictionary named 
‘youthquake’ the 2017 ‘word of the year’. This decision created much controversy amongst political 
commentators who decried the hype around the choice of word (after all, the Labour Party had not 
won the election!). More interestingly, academics have – on the basis of new British Election Study 
data – described the youthquake as a ‘myth’ or a mere ‘tremor’ (Prosser et al. 2018).2. In this article 
we challenge this argument and emphasize the importance of youth engagement in the 2017 General 
Election for several reasons. 
First of all, to dismiss the so-called youthquake as a myth is to take a very narrow view about what 
constitutes political engagement and political change. Even if we presume that turnout amongst 18-
24 year olds did not increase (which is disputed by other polling data),3 we would point to several 
other changes that have reshaped the political landscape: including, the unprecedented rate of youth 
                                                          
1 The Guardian, 9 June 2017, ‘The Youth for Today: How the 2017 Election Changed the Political Landscape’, 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/jun/09/corbyn-may-young-voters-labour-surge 
2 The authors of the BES report claim that there was no surge in electoral turnout amongst 18-24 year olds 
and that the youth vote (due to its numerical size if nothing else) did not swing the election.  
3 We would note that the BES sample size of 18-24 year olds was small (151) and did not (or could not) address 
the voting patterns of distinct sub-groups of young people (e.g. young women, young people in full-time 
education). See Peter Kellner, 31 January 2018, ‘The British Election Study claims there was no “youthquake” 
last June. It’s wrong’, Prospect, https://www.prospectmagazine.co.uk/blogs/peter-kellner/the-british-election-
study-claims-there-was-no-youthquake-last-june-its-wrong  
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support for the Labour Party, high levels of youth activism in the campaign (Pickard 2017), and the 
distinctive cosmopolitan values of young Labour supporters.  
As Sloam and Henn show in their forthcoming book on youth political participation (Palgrave 2018), 
these changes mark both a long-term generational effect as well as a more short-term period effect 
on the values and political habits of Young Millennials growing up in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis and through their experiences of the 2016 EU referendum. When one looks into the 
intragenerational dimensions of the youth vote, the changes in 2017 were remarkable. As we show 
below, the cosmopolitan-left attitudes and orientations of young people are particularly marked 
amongst young students and young women.4 These attitudes and orientations reflect broader 
societal changes that, as Norris and Inglehart (2016) have written, increase the relevance of cultural 
cleavages within contemporary democratic politics. 
We argue that a youthquake equates to much more than voter turnout, and should be seen as a multi-
faceted phenomenon involving fundamental social, political and cultural shifts. It is worth noting that 
the OED itself defines a youthquake as ‘a significant cultural, political, or social change arising from 
the actions or influence of young people’. 
Finally, the narrative effects of the youthquake should not be dismissed out of hand. We would argue 
that the widespread acceptance that a youthquake has happened has had a tangible impact. Corbyn’s 
deliberate targeting of the youth vote, Labour’s unusually high dependency upon youth activists, and 
the unexpectedly strong performance of Labour in the election, have already encouraged the 
Conservative Government to rethink its approach to younger voters, leading to a review of – amongst 
other things – policy on tuition fees.  
In this article, we move beyond the debate about youth turnout in the 2017 General Election to 
examine youth participation from a broader perspective. We investigate the dramatic changes in 
youth voter choice in 2017 and over time, the policy preferences of younger citizens (highlighting the 
differences with older voters), and the important role of online activism. 
 
Turning Left 
One of the most prominent features of the 2017 General Election was the importance of age in 
predicting which party an individual voted for. The Ipsos MORI data reveals some dramatic changes 
(Figure 1). A remarkable 62% of 18-24 year olds voted for the Labour Party, contrasting with 27% for 
the Conservative Party – an unprecedented youth gap of 35 percentage points. It is common to 
assume that the Labour Party is always more popular amongst younger voters, but this is not the 
case. In 2015, 18-24 year olds only supported Labour over Conservative by a margin of 42% to 28%. 
In 2010, the two large parties were locked together (in this age group) with the Liberal Democrats on 
approximately 30%. 
                                                          
4 Clearly not all young people could be considered as participants or fellow travellers in this cosmopolitan-left 
movement, and it is much less reflective of young white men from poorer backgrounds. 
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Another feature of the 2017 General Election was the Labour Party’s capture of third party support – 
particularly from the Liberal Democrats and the Greens. The Liberal Democrats failed to improve on 
their disastrous performance amongst younger voters in 2015 (collapsing from 30% in 2010 to 4% in 
2015). Although the Liberal Democrats managed not to lose further support amongst 18-24 year olds 
in 2017, tactical voting and a further weakening of student support lead to damaging defeats for 
Liberal Democrat incumbents in the university constituencies of Sheffield Hallam (Nick Clegg) and 
Leeds North West (Greg Mulholland). Labour also gained significantly from the Green Party, whose 
share of the youth vote fell form 8% in 2015 to just 2% in 2017.  
 
Youth Support for Parties by Class, Gender and Ethnicity 
The Labour Party’s emphatic lead amongst 18-24 year olds varied across different groups of young 
people (Figure 2). Labour gained greatest support from young BMEs (77%), young women (73%), and 
young people of a low social grade (70%). Whilst we might expect, from previous elections, that social 
grade and student status have a large impact on party support, the scale of the Labour Party’s appeal 
amongst young women and young BMEs was surprising. These results might be attributed to the 
Brexit effect and to the Corbyn effect (both of these groups were very likely to vote Remain, and to 
sympathise with the Labour leader’s views on economic inequality and international relations). 
Interestingly, the large differences in party allegiance by gender and class were not present within 
the population as a whole (adults of all ages). 
The influence of socio-economic status on voting intention has become more complex. In 2017, 
young people of a high social grade were more likely to support Labour than the Conservatives (by 
52% to 31%), but to a smaller degree than the average 18-24 year old. However, full-time students 
were considerably more likely to vote Labour (by 62% to 22%). 
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Young Millennials – the new Cosmopolitan-Left 
Figure 3 shows the policy preferences of young people (18-24 year olds) compared to the average UK 
citizen, and the over 65s. For the youngest cohort of voters, healthcare was considered to be the most 
important issue (27%). This would naturally place Labour at an advantage over the Conservatives, 
with the former traditionally holding ownership of issues surrounding the NHS. The Labour Manifesto 
promised extra funding for the health service. The second most important issue for young people was 
Brexit (15% of younger citizens prioritized this policy area) – another issue where younger voters were 
more closely aligned to the official Labour position than the official Conservative position – and 
education (10%). The next priorities for 18-24 year olds was that of austerity, poverty and economic 
inequalities (13%). In our Populus poll of 1,351 18-30 year olds, we also found that, ‘housing’ emerged 
as a key theme for young people.5 Whilst many of these issues may be long-term problems that have 
persisted for several decades, the polls suggest that young people associated austerity, economic 
inequalities and the increasingly unaffordable costs of housing with seven years of Conservative-led 
government. Conversely, the Labour Manifesto included concrete pledges on greater investment in 
social housing, and the abolition of university tuition fees. 
                                                          
5 Unfortunately, ‘housing’ was not classified as a separate category in Lord Ashcroft Polling data. 
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The perception of the ‘most important political issue’ clearly varies across generations. The 
differences between young and old were largest in the areas of ‘Brexit’ (minus 23 percentage points), 
the NHS (plus 14 points), education (plus 9 points), austerity, cuts and inequalities (plus 7 points), and 
immigration and asylum (minus 5 points).  
The cosmopolitan-left attitudes and sentiments of Young Millennials diverged remarkably from 
those of the over 65s. This relates not just to their policy priorities, but also to the positions adopted 
on the issues. This is particularly the case with regard to the political-cultural issues of Brexit and 
immigration. Our previous study of young people in the run-up to the 2016 EU referendum found 
these two issues were underpinned by diametrically opposed attitudes towards cultural diversity 
amongst young and older citizens. 
 
New Political Communication: Online Mobilisation 
There is growing evidence to suggest that social media are increasingly trusted and consumed by 
young people when it comes to accessing political information. We investigated the following for the 
official accounts of the Labour Party, Conservative Party, Jeremy Corbyn and Prime Minister Theresa 
May across three platforms: Facebook, Twitter and Instagram. 
The Labour Party was more effective at communicating its messages amongst younger voters 
(Fletcher 2017). Boosted by his celebrity endorsements and the emergence of left-leaning, online 
news platforms (such as The Canary), Jeremy Corbyn achieved about three times as many Facebook 
likes (1.4 million) and Twitter followers (1.42 million) as Theresa May. And unlike May, Corbyn was 
more popular than his own party in these social media (by 400,000 Facebook likes and almost a 
million Twitter followers). The Labour social media communications strategy – pioneered during 
Corbyn’s party leadership bid by the grass-roots campaigning group, Momentum – provided an 
effective means of reaching out to younger voters through attractive, interactive content. 
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Discussion 
We believe that efforts to downplay the importance of youth participation in the 2017 General 
Election are too heavily focussed on youth turnout. And, even on the subject of turnout, it is still 
possible that there were significant increases in youth turnout as a whole, in certain geographic 
locations, and amongst various sub-groups of young people (e.g. students).  
It is also important to think carefully about the what constitutes a young person. Andy Furlong (2016) 
and many others in the field of youth studies have shown that young people’s transitions from youth 
to adulthood have become delayed and staggered in modern societies. Although we have focussed 
in this article on 18-24 year olds, it may actually be more helpful to think of younger rather than young 
citizens.   
It is generally accepted that in 2017, age replaced class as the key predictor of party choice. We 
propose two possible explanations for the large differences in voting for parties across age cohorts. 
First, the redistribution of resources away from younger citizens and youth-oriented public policy 
over the past ten years has attracted more young people to the ideas of state intervention and 
increased public spending. Second, cultural differences across generations have deepened. Young 
people are more approving of cultural diversity, welcoming of European integration, and less 
concerned about immigration than older cohorts. Thus, younger voters were attracted by Corbyn’s 
opposition to austerity, his internationalist outlook and to his acceptance of immigration and cultural 
diversity (in contrast to the nationalist-authoritarian populism of Nigel Farage and Donald Trump). 
In the 2017 General Election and the 2016 EU referendum, support for the Labour Party and Remain 
was particularly strong amongst citizens who were young, highly educated, female and supportive of 
cultural diversity in Britain.  
In 2017, younger voters were politically energised by Brexit and Jeremy Corbyn’s Labour Party. In an 
echo of the 1960s, they expressed themselves as left-of-centre cosmopolitans, reacting both to 
austerity politics and the cultural conservatism found in older generations and embodied by the 
Leave campaign in the EU referendum. If voting and voter choice is habit-forming, the mobilization 
of younger voters by the Labour Party in 2017 means that all political parties, particularly the 
Conservative Party, need to try harder to develop a package of policies that can appeal to young 
people if they want to avoid the further ageing of their support base.  
The Labour Party also managed to engage many youth activists through its policy platform and the 
direct efforts of the party leader, Jeremy Corbyn, to interact with younger citizens. Labour certainly 
enjoyed a comfortable advantage over the Conservative Party in the social media space where 
political information is relatively trusted and highly-consumed by Britain’s young people. This led to 
Conservatives, such as Robert Halfon, a former Minister for Education, to argue for a Tory-affiliated 
version of Momentum, to counter Labour’s domination in the digital space. 
We argue that the 2017 General Election marked some profound changes in youth political 
participation. To suggest the youthquake was a myth takes a reductionist approach to youth political 
participation. It also fuels a much more dangerous myth – as could be observed in the media reaction 
to the BES article – the perception in many quarters that young people are apathetic and not 
interested in politics. This counter-narrative has the potential to undermine young people’s sense of 
political efficacy and undermine political support for youth-oriented public policy.  
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